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THE RISE AND FALL OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE -

A CAUTIONARY

TALE

Michael Adler*
This paper comprises a case stud of the historj of the Administrative
justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) in the United Kingdomfrom its
the establishmentin 2007 to its likely demisefivejears later,in 20 12. It
outlines a number of competing approachesto administrativejustice and
identifes some of the key milestones on the road to reforming the ways in
which disputes between citiZens and the state are handledin the UK. It
traces the rise andfdl of the AJTC and considers how arguments/fr the
estab/ishment of an 'oversight bodj' that seemed, until recently, to enjoy
all-partysupport could, within a ver short time, be insufjicient to secure
its continued existence. The paperattempts to assess the contribution of
the AJTC to the achievement of administrativejustice in the UK and
considers the implications of its demise/fbr this goal. Along the way, it
briefy compares the role of the AJTC on a UK-wide basis with that of
its Scottish Committee and assesses the importance of timing and scale
in determining their reipectivefutures. After a brief sideways look at
administrativejusticein India,it concludes by discussingthe implicationsof
strongparliamentarjsovere nty and weak constitutionalprotection,which
togethercharacterisegovernance in the UnitedKingdom, administrative
justice in the United Kingdom.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At one level, this article comprises a case study of a unique institution (the
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council) in the United Kingdom (UK) from
its the establishment in 2007 to its likely demise five years later, in 2012. But, at
a deeper level, it also comprises an analysis of a concept (administrative justice)
and the successive emergence of different dominant conceptions of that concept,
each of which have had different implications for policy.'
The case study is not only of interest in its own right but also because it can
be used to throw light on theories of legislative change. The United Kingdom does
not have a written constitution and there are few limits on what the UK Parliament
1

The coexistence of a single concept with several competing conceptions of it suggests
that administrative justice is, like many other important social and political ideals, essentially
contested (see WB. Gallie, Essentialj Contested Concepts, in PHILOSOPHY AND HisToRCAL
UNDERSTANDING (1964)). As such, it can be defined in a fairly uncontroversial way (in
this case as the principles of justice that apply to administrative procedures) but those
principles are the subject of considerable disagreement.
29

Vol. 8 (2)

Soio-Legal Review

2012

can do. The House of Lords, whose members are appointed for life, can force
the House of Commons, whose members are elected periodically, to think again,
but in the end, the views of the elected House of Commons will normally prevail.
Moreover, although legislation can be challenged by means of judicial review in
the courts, they do not have the power to strike down the legislation. Under the
Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, if a court determines that an Act of Parliament
is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, it can declare the
legislation to be incompatible with it. This does not affect the validity of the
legislation - the HRA does not undermine parliamentary sovereignty as the UK
Parliament is free to decide whether or not to amend the law. This is in marked
contrast with the US Bill of Rights or the German Basic Law, which allow the
courts to strike down incompatible legislation.
In the UK, a 'progressive' government with a majority in the House of
Commons can pass 'progressive' legislation, but there is nothing to stop a
'reactionary' government, as long as it has a majority in the House of Commons,
from reversing it. As a result, 'progressive' measures, like the legislation that
resulted in the establishment of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council
in 2007 and reflected an integrated conception of administrative justice that
combined 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' conceptions, can be very transient. This
is much less likely in countries which have a written constitution, where the
legislation in question is safeguarded by the constitution. Of course, the existence
of a written constitution is not in itself a sufficient guarantee. India has a written
constitution that empowers the Indian Parliament to create tribunals to deal with
administrative disputes - although not to establish ombudsmen to investigate
administrative grievanceS2 - but this power is an enabling one rather than one that
imposes duties on the Government or creates rights for the citizen. Thus there
is nothing in the Constitution to stop a future Indian Parliament from abolishing
the tribunals or the ombudsmen that have been set up in India or requiring the
Indian Government to promote administrative justice.3
2

3

An amendment to the Indian Constitution that would allow for the establishment of a
centralLokpa/(Parliamentary Commissioner) and compelled states to establish their own
Lokayukta (ombudsman) institutions has been introduced into the Indian Parliament
eight times since 1968 but has not yet been enacted.
For an excellent comparative discussion of the role of constitutions, constitutional
30
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In attempting to throw light on the rise and probable fall of the Administrative
Justice and Tribunals Council and to account for the progression of competing
conceptions of administrative justice, the article adopts a 'law in context' approach
and uses socio-legal research methods rather than the well-honed techniques of
the 'black letter' or doctrinal lawyer. Socio-legal approaches adopt an external
perspective to the law in contrast to the internalperspectivefavoured by 'black letter'
or doctrinal scholars. In addition, they usually adopt a 'bottom-up' approach that
focuses on the everyday experiences of members of the public rather than a 'topdown' approach that focuses on the leading cases that are decided in the superior
courts, which is associated with 'black letter' or doctrinal scholarship. The article
is also socio-legal in the sense that it describes the emergence of conceptions of
administrative justice that are grounded in the myriad of first instance decisions,
the ways in which they are experienced and the problems that they can give rise
to. This particular conception of administrative justice has all the hallmarks of
a socio-legal approach.

II.

BACKGROUND

The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) was set up by
statute in 2007, with a wider and more ambitious remit than its predecessor, the
Council on Tribunals (COT), to keep the administrative justice system of the
United Kingdom under review and to ensure that the relationships between the
courts, tribunals, ombudsmen and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
promote justice and reflect the needs of citizens.
Very soon after coming into office in May 2010, and as part of its overall
Spending Review, the new (Conservative-Liberal Democrat) Coalition Government
carried out a review of so-called 'arms-length bodies', i.e. non-departmental public
bodies (NDPBs). As a result of this review, the government proposed that 192
of these bodies should cease to be public bodies with their functions either being
bills of rights, constitutional courts and judicial review and their impact on legislation,
see VICKI C. JACKSON AND NIViu TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTI'UTIONAL LAw (2006),
especially chapters 2-8 and 13. For a very helpful discussion from a UK perspective,
see Chapter 4 of CAROL HARLOW AND RICiARD RAwiNGs, LAW AND ADMINTSTRATTON (3 rd
ed. 2009).
31

Vol. 8 (2)

2012

Socio-Legal Review

brought back into central government, devolved to local government, moved out
of government or abolished altogether. The AJTC was included among the
NDPBs that the government wished to abolish. Although the proposal to
abolish the AJTC was rejected when the Public Bodies Bill was introduced
in the House of Lords and the majority of those who responded to the
Government's consultation on the Bill were in favour of retaining it, 4 the
Government was unmoved, and with the slimmest of majorities, it eventually
got its way. The Bill, which was given Royal Assent on 14 December 2011,
gives the Secretary of State for Justice the power to abolish the AJTC without
introducing legislation to this effect and a draft order to abolish the AJTC
is expected to be laid in the spring of 2012. This will have to be approved
by both Houses of Parliament before it can come into force but it is almost
certain that the Government will get its way.

111.

THE

UK

EXPERIENCE - ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE EMERGES FROM
THE SHADOWS

The terms 'civil justice' and 'criminal justice' are familiar and reasonably
well understood in the United Kingdom. Civil justice refers to the provision by
the state for all its citizens of the 'means by which they can secure the just and
peaceful settlement of disputes between them as to their respective legal rights'
and a remedy if their rights are infringed. Criminal justice refers to the means
for 'convicting and punishing the guilty and helping them to stop offending' and
for 'protecting the innocent'" but also includes the means for detecting crime and
carrying out punishments sanctioned by the courts, such as collecting fines and
supervising community and custodial disposals.
By comparison, the term 'administrative justice' has, until quite recently, been
shrouded in obscurity and was not a concept with which many people - except,
4

MINTSTRY OF JUSTICF, RFSPONSF TO CONSULTATION ON REFORMIS PROPOSED TN TITE PUBuIC
BODTES BILT (2011), at paras 10-12.

5

As cited in LoRD

6

§ 1.2 (1995).
See Hou OFFICE

WOOLF, INTERII REPORT TO jiE LORD CHANCELLOR ON ACCESS IJUSICE,
A GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAIJL STICn SysTEM OE ENGr \ND

(2000).
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perhaps, a few academics and researchers - were familiar.' This contrasts with
administrative law, the body of law that governs the activities of administrative
agencies, which has expanded greatly in recent years and is now a recognised
component of English (and Scots) law. It also contrasts with the plethora of
administrative tribunals, complaints systems and ombudsmen which very large
numbers of people in the United Kingdom have occasion to use.8
A few years ago, the profile of administrative justice began to change - the
UK Government's White Paper, Tranjforming Pub-ic Services:-Complaints, Redress and

Tribunals,published in July 2004,' devoted a chapter to 'The Administrative Justice
Landscape' and recommended, interalia,that the Council on Tribunals, which was
set up in 1959 to keep administrative (and other) tribunals

under review, should

be replaced by an Administrative Justice Council, with a wider remit to keep under
review the performance of the administrative justice system as a whole, which
includes first-instance administrative decision-making, complaints procedures,
ombudsmen and alternative forms of dispute resolution such as mediation as
well as administrative tribunals and the courts, and to advise the government
on changes in legislation, practice and procedure that would improve the ways
in which it works. This and other changes proposed in the White Paper were
implemented in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.11
7

9

In 1997, a large international conference on administrative justice took place at the
University of Bristol. The conference, which was organised by the University's Centre
for the Study of Administrative Justice, led to the establishment of a Steering Group
of conference delegates and civil servants should be set up to promote the realisation
of administrative justice. See AD\MINIsTvRI\l JUSTICE IN THL 21 T CENTuRY (Martin
Partington and Michael Harris eds., 2009: Introduction and Conclusion). However,
these early moves to promote administrative justice were not conspicuously successful.
According to research undertaken for the National Audit Office, 803,000 cases (most
of which were appeals against administrative decisions) were heard by tribunals in 2005,
543,000 complaints were lodged, and 42,000 cases were submitted to ombudsmen and
mediators. See PAIRICK DUNLEAVY ET AL, CITIZEN RLDRuSs: WI-t CIIZENs CAN DcO IF
THINGS GO WRONG IN THE PUBLIC SELnicL's Table 20 (2005).
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONSTTTUTIONAT AFFAIRS, TRANSFORMITNG PUBLTC SERVTTC ES:

10

In the UK, most tribunals deal with citi<en Vs. state disputes but some, notably

8

COMuP AINTS, REDRESS AND TRIIBUN.ATs

11

(2004).

employment tribunals, deal with party vs. party disputes.
In order to take account of the sensitivities of those associated with pary vs. party
tribunals, especially employment tribunals, the supervisory body established by the
2007 Act was to be known as the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council.
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IV. CONTRASTING

2012

APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

As noted in a recent paper by the author,12 a number of contrasting
approaches to administrative justice can be identified. On the one hand, there is
the approach that sees administrative justice in terms of the principles formulated
by the superior courts and, to a lesser extent, by the top tiers of other redress
mechanisms that come into play when people who are unhappy with the outcome
of an administrative decision, or with the process by which that decision was
reached, challenge the decision and seek to achieve a determination in their favour.
We can call this approach the traditional administrativelaw conception of administrative
justice. Although the decisions of the superior courts are of particular importance
for this approach, those of other bodies, such as administrative tribunals (which
hear the large majority of appeals against administrative decisions in the UK)1 3
and ombudsmen (which, in the UK, consider complaints about decision-making
where it is alleged that maladministration or service failures have given rise to
injustice), are also important. Those who adopt the traditional administrative
law approach assume that the principles formulated by courts and other redress
mechanisms are applied and put into effect by first-instance decision makers and
that administrative justice is achieved in this way.
On the other hand, there is the approach that sees administrative justice in
terms of the justice inherent in routine administrative decisions. This approach
does not accept that the formulation of principles by the courts and other redress
mechanisms is sufficient and emphasises the importance of efforts that aim to
improve first-instance decision making directly, such as recruitment procedures,
training and appraisal, standard setting and quality assurance systems. We can
call this approach the justice in administration conception of administrative justice.
While the administrative law approach focuses on the relatively small number
of cases that come before the superior courts and the top tiers of other redress
mechanisms and can be characterised as a 'top-down' approach, the justice in
12

13

Michael Adler and Sara Stendahl, Administrative Lax, Agencies and Redress Mechanisms in
the United Kingdom and Sweden, in Comm1uxRAIvL L AWv ND SOciETY, (David S. Clark ed.,
forthcoming 2012).
Unlike the USA and many European countries, the UK does not have a separate system
of administrative courts.
34
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administration approach focuses on the huge number of first-instance decisions
and can be characterised as a 'bottom-up' approach.14
However, the choice is not simply between these two approaches. There
is a third approach which sees the merits in both of the above approaches and
seeks to combine them." It is thus more wide-ranging than either of the other
approaches because, although it recognises the importance of courts, tribunals,
ombudsmen and other external redress mechanisms that the administrative law
approach of administrative justice is pre-occupied with, it is also concerned with
other (internal) means of enhancing the justice of administrative decisions that
the justice in administration approach of administrative justice focuses on. It
sees administrative justice as something that applies to an end-to-end process
that begins with an administrative decision and ends, in a small minority of
cases, with the decision of an ombudsman, a tribunal or a court. We can call this
approach the integratedconeption of administrative

justice.

It places considerable

importance on 'feedback', i.e. on first-instance decision-makers drawing lessons
from judgments made in cases that are subject to challenge.

V. THE

SWING OF THE PENDULUM

The importance attached to these contrasting approaches to administrative
justice has ebbed and flowed in recent years. Until quite recently, the administrative
law conception of administrative justice was dominant in the UK - textbook
discussions of administrative justice analysed the principles found in the judgments
of the superior courts, particularly in actions of judicial review, and policy makers
were relatively inactive. In parallel with this, socio-legal researchers undertook a
number of empirical studies of tribunals, 6 although there have been few studies
of front-line decision making in recent years." In addition, many government
14
15
16

17

See Paul A. Sabatier, Top-Down andBottom-UpApproaches to Implementation Research: a Critical
Analysis and Suggested Synthesis, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 21-48 (1986).
Ibid.
For a review of research on tribunal users' experiences, perceptions and expectations,
see MICH-ALL ADLER AND JACIKIl GULLAND, TRIBUNAL USERs' EXPERIENCES, PEuriONS
AND ExPuCTAIONS: A LiLlRtuiw RLviw (2003)..
One major hurdle to conducting research of this kind is that it requires the approval
of the government department or public body concerned, and they are distinctlv
35
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departments conduct customer satisfaction surveys." In different ways, empirical
studies of tribunals and customer satisfaction surveys embody the justice in
administration conception of administrative justice which constituted a challenge
to the administrative law approach. However, in the UK, the pendulum swung
towards the integrated conception of administrative justice. Thus, the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 defined the administrative justice system as:
The overallsystem by which decisions of an administrativeor executive nature are made in
relation to particularpersons, including
(a) the proceduresjor making such decisions,
(b) the law under which such decisions are made, and
(c) the systems for resolving disputes and airinggrievances in relation to such decisions."
In this definition, administrative justice embraces the concerns of the
administrative law approach with the 'law in the books' and with the determinations
of courts, tribunals and ombudsmen that resolve disputes and grievances, as well
as the concerns of the justice in administration approach with decision-making
procedures.
The White Paper Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals
(referred to above), which preceded the 2007 Act, approached administrative
justice from the perspective of the normative expectations held by members of
the public. Thus, it made it clear that:
unenthusiastic about this kind of research. A recent example of such a study is Weber's
research on the detention of asylum seekers at UK ports of entry. See LE \NNE WEBER
AND LORtuuNE GELSTHORPE, DECIDING To DETAIN: How DcIMisioNS To DAI uN AsYLUM
SEEKERS ARE MADE AT PORTS OF ENTRY (2000) and LEANNE WEBER AND TODD LANDMAN,
DECTDTNG TO DETAIN: TTE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT FOR DFCISIONS TO DFTAIN AsvwTnf
SEEKERS AT UK PORTS (2002). The National Audit Office, which audits most publicsector bodies in the UK and produces value for money reports on the implementation
of Government policies, has carried out a number of enquiries, which have included
appraisals of front-line decision making. See, for example, N\:IION\L AuDIr OiicL,
GFYrTNG IT RIGTIT, PUTTING Tr RTIT SocTAL SECURITY BENFEFTTS

18

19

IM\IPROVING D

TISTON-MAKITNG AND APPFAIS IN

(2003).

For example, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) publishes an annual survey
of Jobcentre Plus 'customers'. The most recent report is STuNv JOHNSON AND YVETTIEI
FIDLR,JOaNcNTRE PLUS CUSTMiER SYIISFcTION SuviY 2007, DWP RESEARCH RLPORI
No. 480 (2008).
Part 2, para. 13(4) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007.
36
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[w e are allentitled to receive correct deisions on ourpersonal ircumstances;where a mistake
occers we are entitled to complain and to have the mistake put rght with the minimum of
di;iculty; where there is uncertainty we are entitled to a quick resolution of the issue; and we
are entitled to expect that,where things have gone wron , the system willlearn/romtheproblem
andwilldo betterin the future. (Secretaryof State for ConstitutionalA/fairr2004:para 1.5).
The White Paper defined administrative justice in terms of these normative
expectations, pointing out that they apply to the huge number of 'routine'
administrative decisions that officials make every day. However, at the same time,
it is largely concerned with reforming the procedures for dealing with disputes
and complaints, and with improving the feedback from dispute and complainthandling procedures to first-instance decision makers, not because it is regarded
as the only, or even the most important, means of ensuring that front-line
decision makers 'get it right in the first place' but because it is assumed that this
can contribute towards that end.
According to the White Paper (ibid., Para 1.6), 'the sphere of administrative
justice... embraces not just courts and tribunals but the millions of decisions taken
by thousands of civil servants and other officials'. From the standpoint of this
paper, this was a most welcome change and pointed the way to a real enhancement
of administrative justice for millions of people who are on the receiving end of
administrative decisions. Its realisation would, however, have called for a much
more proactive approach on the part of policy makers and for the prioritising
of administrative justice over competing pressures associated with the pursuit of
lower unit costs and efficiency savings.
The enhanced role in promoting administrative justice that was given to

the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council,2 its promotion of a set of
'principles of administrative justice',21 designed to be used by officials in public
bodies, and of a set of recommendations for 'getting it right first time' 22 also
20

The hybrid name was intended to assuage the concerns of a relatively small number
of party vs. party tribunals, in particular employment tribunals which are not really part
of the administrative justice system.

21

ADMINis'llltAinv LJUSTICEI AND TIBUNALS COUNCIL, PRINCIPLES OF ADNIINsnIx IrLJUs>1(IL

22

ADMINTSTRATIVF JUSTIC FA-ND TRIBUNALS COUNCITL, RIcTiT FIRST TTMF REPORT

(2010).

3'

(2011).
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constituted grounds for optimism. However, the new Coalition Government's
enthusiasm for simplification and its intention to abolish the Administrative Justice
and Tribunals Council as part of its plan to abolish or merge more than 192 nondepartmental public bodieS23

ostensibly to cut costs and increase accountability

- not to mention its stringent programme of public expenditure cuts, which will,
inter alia, reduce the resources allocated to administration, indicate that any gains
for administrative justice may only have been very short-term.

VI.

KEY MILESTONES ALONG THE

ROAD

Before considering the consequences of the probable abolition of the
AJTC for administrative justice, it may be helpful to outline the main changes in
official thinking over the last 50 years about the ways in which disputes between
the citizen and the state should be handled. This involves comparing the Franks
Report, 24 which was published in 1957 and led to the Tribunals and Enquiries
Act 1958, with the Leggatt Report,25 which was published in 2001 and led to the
2004 White Paper and the Tribunals, Courts and EnforcementAct 2007.

1. The Franks Report
In 1955, the Lord Chancellor at that time, Viscount Kilmuir, invited Sir Oliver
Franks (as he then was) to chair a Committee to consider, as one part of its remit,
'the constitution and working of tribunals, other than the ordinary courts of law'.
In the UK, most disputes between the citizen and the state are heard by bodies
known as tribunals, rather than by the ordinary courts. Tribunals resemble, but
are more informal than and, at least until recently, have been less independent
than the specialised administrative courts that exist in many jurisdictions, e.g. in
the USA and in many European countries.
The Committee, which reported in 1957, concluded that tribunals 'should
properly be regarded as machinery provided by Parliament for adjudication rather
23
24

By the time the Bill had completed its passage through Parliament, the number had
been reduced from 192 to 177.
SIR OLIVER FlRLNKS, RLPORI' OFTHE COMIMITTEE ON TRIBUNALS AND INQUIRIES (1957).

25

SIR ANDREW LEGGATT, TRIBUN.ALS FOR USERS -

38
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than as part of the machinery of administration.2 Three characteristics - openness,
fairness and impartiality - were proposed as the hallmarks of good tribunals and
a number of recommendations were made with the aim of ensuring that these
principles would, in general, govern the working of tribunals.2 Publication of the
Report led to the passage of the Tribunals and InquiriesAct 1958 (UK) and to the
establishment of the Council on Tribunals, which was given statutory responsibility
for keeping under review those tribunals that were placed under its jurisdiction.
In the period following the publication of the Franks Report, there was a
phenomenal growth in the number of tribunals - 50 years afterwards, 70 tribunals
were supervised by the Council on Tribunals and a further 24 by its Scottish
Committee 28 - and, over the years, tribunals became more and more like courts. 29
The proliferation of tribunals happened in a piecemeal fashion, in parallel with the
development of the welfare state and the growth of state regulation, to meet the
political and policy needs of 'sponsoring departments'. Although the Council on
Tribunals attempted to resist the establishment of new tribunals, to encourage a
degree of procedural standardisation, and to raise standards of tribunal decisionmaking, the limited resources that were available to it restricted its effectiveness.
It has not had a good press - for example, with a part-time chairman, 10-15 parttime members, a staff of six and a budget of only

(1.25m, it has been described

as a 'shoestring operation'" and its operations have been compared unfavourably
with those of the Law Commission, an independent statutory body that keeps
the law under review and recommends reform where it is thought to be needed.

2. The Leggatt Report
More recently, the need for a further review of tribunals was recognised by
a subsequent Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg.3 In May 2000, he argued
26
27

Franks, supra note 24, at para 40.
Ibid, at paras 23-24.

28
29

See Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 2006/2007, HC 733 (2007:Appendix G).
See generally, Nick Wikeley, Burying Bell: Managing the Judicialisationof Social Security Tibunals,
63 MOD. L. REv. 475-501 (2000) and Harlow and Rawlings, supranote 3, at chapter 11.
Harlow and Rawlings, supra note 3, at 506-507.
For a fuller account, see MIichael Adler, Waiting in the Wings: The Leggatt Report, the White Paper
and the Reform of Tribunals, 13 J. ow SOcIAL SECURITY L. 73-85 (2006).

30
31

39
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that, after reforming the civil and criminal justice systems, it was time to review
the administrative justice system and announced that he had commissioned Sir
Andrew Leggatt, a former Lord Justice of Appeal, to conduct a wide-ranging
review of tribunals.
The Leggatt Report recommended that all tribunals should be brought together
into a unitary Tribunals Service, which would be an Executive Agency within the
Lord Chancellor's Department and, as such, would be in a position analogous to
that of the Court Service. Since the Lord Chancellor's Department was not an
'interested party' in any tribunal proceedings, this would ensure that tribunals were
more independent from those government departments that not only 'sponsored'
them but had an interest in the outcome of the cases they determined.
Leggatt proposed that the unitary Tribunals Service should be organised into
a number of divisions, each defined in terms of its subject matter. He further
recommended that the Tribunals Service should have a two-tier structure, making
it possible for appeals from all First Tier tribunals to be heard in a second-tier or
appellate division. He also proposed that it should, as far as possible, develop
common administrative procedures and information technology systems, and
that it should seek to exploit the opportunities for economies of scale, not least
in terms of the use of its estate. The Leggatt Report argued that an important
goal of reform should be to make tribunal procedures so 'user friendly' that, in
the majority of cases, 'users' would be able to represent themselves. Although it
supported the provision of pre-hearing advice, Leggatt said nothing about lay
representation and was strongly opposed to legal representation at public expense.
In March 2003, the Lord Chancellor announced that the Government
had accepted the general approach to reform taken by the Leggatt Report and,
after further negotiations with government departments, a White Paper was
published in July 2004.

3. The 2004 White Paper and the 2007 Act
The White Paper accepted most of the key recommendations in the
Leggatt Report and proposed that all tribunals that were administered by central
40
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government departments should be brought together into a new Tribunals
Service (TS), which would be an Executive Agency within the Department
for Constitutional Affairs (DCA). 32 It proposed that the TS should, in the first
instance, be based on the ten largest tribunals and that other tribunals might
join later.
Although employment tribunals were given judicial autonomy within the TS, 3
the arguments of those who believed that they should remain outside the new
service were overruled. The White Paper favoured a two-tier service but rejected
the idea of a divisional structure that had been proposed in the Leggatt Report
on the grounds that the limited number of jurisdictions that would be brought
together in the new TS made this unnecessary. 34
The White Paper was considerably more ambitious than the Leggatt
Report in that it aimed not only to reform the organisation and operation of
tribunals but also to improve the entire system of administrative justice. It
emphasised the importance of improving first-instance decision making for
administrative justice. However, although it attached considerable importance to
feedback from the new, unitary, TS, it did not consider other ways of improving
first-instance decision making.
It took Leggatt's proposals for tribunal reform very seriously but considered
them alongside other systems of redress, such as complaints procedures,
ombudsmen and judicial review. It aimed to 'turn on its head the Government's
traditional emphasis first on courts, judges and court procedures, and second on
legal aid to pay mainly for litigation lawyers', claiming that its aim was 'to develop
a range of policies and services that, so far as possible, will help people to avoid
problems and legal disputes in the first place; and where they cannot, provide
tailored solutions to resolve the dispute as quickly and cost-effectively as possible'.
32
33
34
35

The DCA replaced the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) in June 2003 and was
itself replaced by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in May 2007.
The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal, are described as 'distinct
pillars' within the Tribunals Service, which provides administrative support for them.
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, supra note 9, at para. 6.38.
Ibid, at para 2.2.
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The White Paper referred to this as 'proportionate dispute resolution'.
However, as far as representation at tribunal hearings was concerned, it took a very
similar position to the one taken by the Leggatt Report, arguing that '[h]earings
are intended to be less formal and adversarial in nature' and that this 'ought in
time to reduce the need for representation'. 6
Although tribunal adjudication is a somewhat muted form of the adjudication
encountered in civil and criminal courts, the White Paper was very conscious
of the pathology of what Kagan has referred to as 'adversarial legalism' 3

and

quite explicitly set out to limit its impact. To promote this broader approach to
administrative justice, the White Paper proposed that the Council on Tribunals
should evolve into an Administrative Justice Council (subsequently re-styled the
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in order to take account of the
sensitivities of those associated withpay vs.pary tribunals, especially employment
tribunals). As a result of this, the restyled Council was given a wider remit and
correspondingly greater responsibilities than the Council on Tribunals."

VII.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TRIBUNALS SERVICE

Lord Justice Carnwath, a senior judge who has sat in the Court of Appeal
since 2001, was appointed 'Shadow' Senior President of Tribunals in July 2004'
and the Tribunals Service was set up, in advance of legislation, in April 2006. The
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which - unlike the White Paper
- made provision for the organisation of tribunal business into 'chambers',"
was given Royal Assent in July and, soon after that, Lord Justice Carnwath was
appointed Senior President4 and the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council
was established.
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Ibid, at para. 10.11.
See R. A. IKALGAN, ADVERSAuA\L

LEUSM: THE AMIERICAN VA Oi Lw (2001).
However, the responsibility for drafting model tribunal rules has been taken away from
the predominantly lay Council and given to a new Tribunals Procedure Committee,
comprising a majority of judicial members.
Section 7, Schedule 4 of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:.
Lord Justice Carnwath will step down as Senior President of Tribunals in April 2012
when he joins the Supreme Court.
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The Tribunals Service initially comprised the largest tribunals, some of which
were already administered by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, while
others were transferred from other government departments. However, over
time it has grown and currently comprises 32 tribunals.4 1 The First-tier Tribunal,
which hears appeals at first instance from administrative decisions, now has six
chambers 42 (a seventh chamber is to be added),43 while the Upper Tribunal, which
hears appeals on points of law from decisions of the First-tier Tribunal, has four
chambers.4 4 Each Chamber comprises cognate jurisdictions and calls for similar
types of expertise in determining appeals. As mentioned above, Employment
Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal constitute 'distinct pillars' which
stand apart from these chambers, although they do receive administrative support
from the Tribunals Service.
Each chamber of the First Tier Tribunal is headed by a chamber president
and, within each chamber, each section/jurisdiction is headed by a principal judge.
In all cases, decisions are made by a tribunal judge who may sit alone or with one
or two other members. The practice varies between chambers and sections, and
also depends on the complexity of the appeal. In most cases, appeals against
decisions of the First Tier Tribunal can be made to the Upper Tribunal, but only
with the permission of the First Tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal.4 5
The 2007 Act provides for a Tribunal Procedure Committee (TPC), which
can make tribunal rules for the First Tier and Upper Tribunals, and new sets of
procedural rules have been introduced for each chamber. In doing so, the TPC has
been guided by a number of principles: it has attempted to make the rules as simple
41
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Including those tribunals that are outside the unified two-tier structure. See Tribunals
Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2009-2010, 2010 TRIB. SERV: Annex 1). The
Residential Property Tribunal was transferred to the Tribunals Service in July 2011.
A General Regulatory Chamber, a Health Education and Social Care Chamber, an
Immigration and Asylum Chamber, a Social Entitlement Chamber (dealing, inter alia,
with social security), and a Tax Chamber.
The Land, Property and Housing Chamber.
An Administrative Appeals Chamber, a Tax and Chancery Chamber, an Immigration
and Asylum Chamber, and a Lands Chamber.
In the case of Criminal Injuries Compensation and Asylum Support cases, there is
technically no right of appeal, but a decision may be reviewed by way of an application

to the Upper Tribunal for judicial review of the First Tier Tribunal's decision.
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and straightforward as possible; to avoid unnecessarily technical language, to enable
tribunals to continue to operate tried and tested procedures which have been shown
to work well; and to adopt common rules across tribunals wherever possible.4 6
The establishment of the Tribunals Service constituted a striking change for
the better in the procedures for resolving citieen vs. state disputes. Tribunal justice
was upgraded and, although reform is an ongoing process, the case for it, as set
out in the Leggatt Report and in the White Paper, would appear to have been
largely realised. However, as far as administrative justice was concerned, there
were clearly problems.
Under Section 43 of the 2007 Act, the Senior President is required to make
an annual report on the cases heard by the First Tier and Upper Tribunals. This
provision was intended to lead to improvements both in the workings of the two
tribunals and in the standards of initial decision-making and review in the cases
they heard. However, in his first Annual Report, the Senior President noted that
he saw little point in doing so 'unless and until there is a responsive culture in the
receiving departments and machinery to give it effect'.4
Although it is clear that LordJustice Carnwath did not think these conditions
had been met in the 'receiving departments', it is a hopeful sign that, in his
second Annual Report, he referred to a number of initiatives in the Department
for Work and Pensions, which is responsible for social security in the UK and
makes the largest contribution to the Tribunals Service's caseload, that were
designed to get decisions right the first time.48 However, in light of the stringent
programme of public expenditure cuts and the reduced resources that are available
for administration, it must be recognised that the prospects of achieving major
improvements in administrative justice by such means are not great.
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Senior President of Tribunals, Annual Report: Tribunals Transformed, MIN. Oi JusT. 24
(2010).
Ibid., at para 12.
Senior President of Tribunals,AnnualReport MIN. oi JusT. 10-11 (2011). These initiatives
include 'reconsideration pilots' in which decision-makers are asked to reassess cases
by asking whether they can support the decision in question, and the provision of
'benchmark decisions' by senior tribunal judges which can provide guidance for original
decision-makers in some common areas of difficulty.
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Still, as far as tribunals were concerned, the new, two-tiered, multi-chambered
framework provided a very promising institutional framework for resolving citizjen

vs. state disputes in a 'user-friendly' way that was both 'fir? for purpose' and different
from the way in which most pay vs. pary disputes were dealt with in the courts.
However, this sense that tribunals had been brought in from the cold and the general
feeling of optimism that their status had been upgraded was not to last for long.
In March 2010, the outgoing Labour Government announced that Tribunals
Service would be merged with Her Majesty's Court Service to form a new unified
body for all courts and tribunals in England and Wales. No timetable was given but
a consultation with stakeholders was promised. Both commitments were taken over
by the incoming Coalition Government and, after a very superficial consultation
exercise, the merger took place on 1 April 2011 with the formation of Her Majesty's
Courts and Tribunals Service, which, as was the case with the Tribunals Service, is
an agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). This, at the very least, puts a very big
question mark over the prospects for tribunal justice in the UK.
It should be noted that both the constituent parts of the new unified Courts
and Tribunals Service were recent creations - Her Majesty's Court Service, which
integrated the Magistrates' Courts Service with the Courts Service, was established
in 2005 and the Tribunals Service in 2006 - and that the prospect of an eventual
merger was not envisaged when they were set up. A merger between them was
not the subject of prior consultation with stakeholders and the case for merger
was not well made by the government. In his response to consultation, Richard
Thomas, Chair of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, expressed
concern that the merger would raise significant risks for tribunal users if it led to
a 'one size fits all' approach that took insufficient account of differences in the
ways in which citi-len vs. state disputes are handled in tribunals and par

vs: party
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disputes are handled in courts.

There is, of course, some overlap between courts and tribunals. Some courts,
particularly lower-tier courts dealing with small claims, housing disputes and
family matters, have adopted the active, interventionistand enabling procedures that
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are associated with tribunals and, especially where the parties are not represented,
adopt inquisitonialrather than adversarialprocedures. At the same time, some
tribunals, particularly when the parties are represented, are rather formal, adopt
a 'hands-off approach' and favour adversarialrather than inquisitorialprocedures.
Some people argue that it doesn't matter what the forum is called, i.e. whether it is
called a 'court' or a 'tribunal', that what matters is the appropriateness of the procedures
that are adopted and that a unified Courts and Tribunals Service should be in a good
position to determine the appropriate procedure for dealing with different types of
disputes. However, there are real differences in culture between courts and tribunals
and there is little doubt about who the senior partner in this merger is. There is thus a
real danger that a 'court culture' will prevailin the unified Courts and Tribunals Service
and that the distinctive approach to dispute resolution that has been associated with
tribunals, and championed by its supporters, will be put at risk.

VIII.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND
TRIBUNALS COUNCIL

1. The UK Position
The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) was established
under Section 44 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 on 1
November 2007 with a wider and more ambitious remit than its predecessor,
the Council on Tribunals (COT). Although the resources available to it were not
increased to take account of its wider responsibilities, the Council responded
enthusiastically to its enhanced role in promoting administrative justice.
It has published a set of 'principles of administrative justice'," which embrace
the integrated conception of administrative justice outlined above. These comprise
seven 'core principles' that apply across the 'administrative justice landscape', i.e. to
first-instance decision makers, tribunals, ombudsmen and courts. It has also produced
a set of recommendations for 'getting it right first time'," which stress the importance
of 'feedback' that should make it possible for first-instance decision makers to learn
50
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Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (2010).
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (2011).
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from their mistakes, i.e. from those cases that give rise to appeals and complaints and
are upheld by tribunals and ombudsmen.
Very soon after coming into office in May 2010, and as part of its overall
Spending Review, the new Coalition Government reviewed the position of
so-called 'arms-length bodies', i.e. non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs).
As a result of this review, it proposed that 192 of these bodies should cease
to be public bodies with their functions either being brought back into central
government, devolved to local government, moved out of government, merged
with another body or abolished altogether. Ostensibly, the aim was to cut
costs, reduce bureaucracy and increase accountability. While it is unclear what
the financial savings from this 'bonfire' will be, it will undoubtedly weaken
government and civil society and is hard to square with the Prime Minister's
vision of 'the big society'.
The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council was initially included in
Schedule 1, which listed the bodies that were to be abolished. However, when
the Bill was introduced into the House of Lords and, on 29 March 2011, the
Lords voted in favour of an amendment moved by the Conservative Peer Lord
Newton, who had been Chair of the AJTC,5 2 to move the Administrative Justice
and Tribunals Council from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2, which comprised bodies
that were to be merged; the Government was unmoved. When the Commons
considered the Lords amendments to the Bill, it used its majority in the Commons
to reinstate the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council in the list of bodies
in Schedule 1 that it wished to abolish.
A last-ditch attempt to save the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council
was made in the House of Lords on 23 November 2011 when an amendment
to that effect, again moved by Lord Newton, was defeated by 233 votes to 236,
i.e. by a Government majority of 3.13 The Bill, which was given Royal Assent on
52
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And its predecessor, the Council on Tribunals.
The Government's determination to proceed with the abolition of the AJTC may have
been influenced by the fact that, late in the day, the Ministry of Justice had decided not
to not to abolish two other bodies that originally appeared in Schedule 1 of the Bill,
the Youth Justice Board and the Office of the Chief Coroner.
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14 December 2011, gives the Secretary of State for Justice the power to abolish
the AJTC without introducing legislation to this effect, notwithstanding the fact
that the AJTC was created by primary legislation54 and a draft order to abolish
the AJTC is expected to be laid in the Spring of 2012. As with other such Orders
under the Public Bodies Act 2011, it will have to be approved by both Houses of
Parliament before it can come into force. However, although nothing is certain,
it is very likely that the Government will get its way.
In reviewing its arms-length bodies, the Ministry of Justice was required to
address the overarching question of whether the body needed to exist and whether
its functions needed to be carried out at all. Where the answer was 'yes', it was
then asked to assess whether the body in question satisfied any of the following
three tests: did it perform a technical function, did its activities require political
impartiality and did it need to act independently to establish facts? In the case of
the AJTC, the MOJ argued that the development of administrative justice policy
was properly a function of government and that the existence of an advisory
body resulted in a duplication of effort and a waste of resources. It claimed that
independence was not a prerequisite for advice on administrative justice policy
and that MOJ officials 'working in close consultation with stakeholders' could
provide 'objective, impartial and expert advice'.
However, in its report on the proposed abolition of the AJTC, published on 8
March 2012, a Select Committee of the House of Commons (House of Commons
Public Administration Select Committee 2012) was clearly unconvinced and called
on the Government to 'revisit its' plans'.

6

It agreed with the Government that

responsibility for the development of policy in relation to administrative justice
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In its report on the Public Bodies Bill, published in November 2010, the House of Lords
Constitution Committee argued that, by denying Parliament the opportunity to debate
and deliberate on proposals to abolish, merge, and modify the public bodies identified
in the Bill, these provisions were nothing short of a violation of the constitutions. See
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properly belonged to the MOJ but did not share the Government's view that
this function was duplicated by the AJTC. It also accepted the Government's
argument that some functions of the AJTC had been taken over by HMCTS but
concluded that the need for independent oversight of the administrative justice
system remained. Crucially, it questioned whether the proposal to abolish the
AJTC met any of the three criteria for deciding whether to retain a public body.
It also considered that the MOJ's estimates of cost savings were exaggerated and
called on the Government to provide more detailed information about how it
proposed to take over the AJTC's functions and about its plans for improving
administrative decision making and redress mechanisms. It concluded that, if the
AJTC is abolished, the MOJ should report annually to Parliament on the operation
of the administrative justice system.

2. The Position in Scotland
The Leggatt Report was commissioned by the Lord Chancellor and covered
two sets of tribunals: tribunals in England and Wales and Great Britain-wide
tribunals. The 2004 White Paper and the 2007 Act likewise dealt with these sets
of tribunals and the Tribunals Service, which was introduced by the 2007 Act,
related to them as well. The position in Scotland differs in that the Tribunals
Service in Scotland only includes a subset of 'reserved' tribunals while 'devolved'
tribunals continue to function outside it.s
In part because the Scottish Government in Edinburgh has had different
priorities from the UK Government in London," tribunal reform in Scotland
has lagged behind tribunal reform elsewhere in the UK by several years. In
57
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Following devolution and the passage of the Scotland Act 1998, 'reserved' matters refer
to those that are the responsibility of the UK Parliament and the UK Government while
'devolved' matters are those that became the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament
and the Scottish Government.
These priorities included reform of ombudsmen institutions. The Scottish Public
Services Ombudsman (SPSO) was set up in 2002 as the final stage in the procedure for
dealing with complaints against the Scottish Executive (now the Scottish Government),
the NHS in Scotland, Scottish local authorities and hosing associations. Since then,
responsibilities for hearing complaints against most water and sewerage providers,
colleges and universities and prisons have been added. As far as ombudsmen are
concerned, Scotland has a much more integrated set of arrangements than England.
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2008, the Administrative Justice Steering Group, chaired by Lord Philip,
identified five options for tribunal reform in Scotland" but indicated that
only two of them - the establishment of a new Scottish Tribunals Service,
either for 'devolved' tribunals or for all ('reserved' and 'devolved') tribunals
sitting in Scotland, would satisfy the key principles of independence and
impartiality. The Scottish Committee of the Administrative Justice and
Tribunals Council, in response to a request to submit advice on these options
to the Scottish Government, came to a similar conclusion, and recommended
the establishment of a Scottish Tribunals Service, chaired by a Senior President
of Scottish Tribunals, which would include all 'reserved' and 'devolved'
tribunals sitting in Scotland.6 0
The Scottish Government subsequently set up a Scottish Tribunals
Service (STS) which will, as a first step, provide administrative support for
five 'devolved' tribunals,"1 with the prospect of further reforms to come.
The question of who will provide the judicial leadership of the Scottish
Tribunals Service and the issue of the relationship between the STS and HM
Courts and Tribunals Service in England and Wales are still to be resolved.
This would suggest that, as far as tribunal reform is concerned, Scotland is
a few years behind England.
Like its predecessor, the Council on Tribunals, the Administrative Justice
and Tribunals Council has a Scottish Committee, whose remit is to keep under
review the overall administrative justice system in Scotland and the reserved
and devolved tribunals that sit in Scotland and come under its oversight.
As a Committee of the AJTC, it contributes to the advice that the Council
gives to UK Ministers but also reports directly to Scottish Ministers. If the

AJTC is abolished, the Scottish Committee would no longer exist, although it
could, if the Scottish Government chose the option, become a free-standing
59
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body with similar responsibilities.6 2 Although the MOJ appears to have ruled
out a merger between the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council and
the Civil Justice Council in England and Wales; the Scottish Government is
actively considering whether the Scottish Civil Justice Council that, following
one of the recommendations of Lord Gill's Civil Courts Review,63 it proposes
to set up, should have responsibilities for administrative justice as well as
for civil

justice.6 4

It is too early to say whether this proposal will find favour with the Scottish
Government but there is a possibility that some of the oversight and policy
advice functions of the AJTC may be taken over by a body with responsibility
for both civil and administrative justice in Scotland. That may not be an ideal
outcome but is probably the best that can be achieved in the circumstances. If
the Scottish Civil Justice Council does take over some of the functions of the
Scottish Committee of AJTC, administrative justice might still have a champion
in Scotland.

IX. THE IMPLICATIONS

OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

UK FOR INDIA

What is the meaning and significance of the developments outlined in
this paper for India? India does have a system of administrative tribunals
although, by comparison with the United Kingdom, it is both at an early stage
of development and much in need of reform. Article 323A of the Indian
Constitution empowers Parliament to create administrative tribunals to deal
with disputes involving civil servants, either at Union or State level, while
Article 323B enables Parliament and the State legislatures to create tribunals
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In its 1957 Report, the Franks Committee: recommended that separate Councils on
Tribunals should be set up in Scotland and in England and Wales. See Franks, supra note
24, at para 43.
LORD GrIil, RFPORT OF TITE SCOTTISH Cwni COURTS REVNTEW (2009).
In September 2011, the Scottish Government issued a consultation paper on the
creation of a Scottish CivilJustice Council in which, inter alia, respondents were asked
whether they thought the Council should be able to make recommendations in relation
to administrative justice and tribunals. The Scottish Committee of the AJTC responded
positively to this suggestion, provided that the structure and composition of the Council
reflected the importance of its responsibilities in respect of administrative justice.
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to deal with a wide range of disputes." A decision of the Supreme Court"
has made it clear that Parliament (and State Legislatures) are empowered to
create tribunals to deal with any matter within their jurisdiction. Although
the constitutional amendment inserting Articles 323A and 323B was passed
in 1976, the Administrative Tribunals Act was not passed until 1985. Since
1990, according to one commentator, 'Central Government went into high
gear and started creating one tribunal after another' and 'the new millennium
has seen a further proliferation of tribunals'.

However, the growth of

tribunals has been haphazard and there is no policy for determining which
types of citizen vs. state dispute should be dealt with by the civil courts and
which by tribunals.
Many tribunals are controlled by the executive who manage the appointment,
promotion and transfer of members. Members are often former civil servants who
lack the requisite judicial skills. Some of them are on leave from their previous
job and members are often appointed as a 'pre-retirement perk'.
In 1966, the Indian Government set up an Administrative Reforms
Commission (ARC) headed by Morarji Desai, who later became the Prime
Minister of India. The ARC recommended the establishment of ombudsman
institutions (known as Lokpal at the Central Government and Lokayukta at the
State Government level respectively) for investigating citizens' grievances relating
to administrative actions taken by or on behalf of Central Government, State
Governments and certain public authorities. These institutions were intended to
be independent of the executive and to supplement the courts. 6
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Levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax; foreign exchange/import and
export disputes; industrial labour disputes; land reforms; urban land ceilings; election
disputes of Parliament, State Legislatures; production and distribution of essential
commodities; control legislation; offences and fees payable in regard to any of the
above. See Arvind P Datar, The Tribunalisationof justice in India, Act A JuRic
288-302
(2006).
Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association, (2002) 4 SCC 275.
Datar,supra note 65, at 292.
Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr., HangingFire since 1968, Willit be Ninth time Luck forLokpal?,
DATTY NExs & ANAINSTS,July 5, 2011, availableat http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/

report hanging-fire-since- 1968-will-it-be- ninth-time-lucky-for-lokpal_1562387.
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The recommendation to set up Lokpal and Lokayukta institutions was
intended to improve the standard of public administration, by looking into
complaints against administrative actions, including allegations of corruption,
favouritism and official indiscipline. Bills that would have established a central
Lokpal institution (Parliamentary Commissioner) and compelled States to establish
their own Lokayukta institutions have been introduced into the Indian Parliament
eight times since 1968 but none of them have been enacted so far. However, at
the local level, many States have taken the initiative and passed their own Lokayukta
Acts.6 1 Since the structure and scope of Lokayukta are not uniform, an amendment
to the Indian Constitution has been proposed to implement Lokayuktainstitutions
uniformly across all Indian States.
From the above it is clear that, in recent years, India has seen a rapid but
haphazard growth of administrative tribunals which are not independent of the
executive and cannot be relied on to produce just outcomes in the citiken iv. state
disputes that they adjudicate. Although the majority of India's 28 states now have
ombudsman-type institutions (Lokayukta) for investigating citizens' grievances,
these focus on corruption, favouritism and official indiscipline rather than the
more mundane forms of maladministration giving rise to injustice that constitute
the 'bread and butter' work of ombudsmen in the United Kingdom. Significantly,
there is, as yet, no ombudsman-type institution (Lokpal) for investigating citizens'
grievances against Central Government.
Although, albeit at an early stage of development, some of the constituent
parts of an administrative justice system are in place in India, there is, as yet, little
awareness of administrative justice as a set of principles and practices concerned with
the ways in which administrative decisions are made and administrative disputes
are dealt with. There is little awareness that administrative justice deals with an
end-to-end process that begins with myriads of administrative decisions and ends,
69

Orissa was the first state to present a bill on establishment of Lokayukta in 1970, but
Maharashtra was the first to establish the institution, in 1972. Other states followed:
Rajasthan (1973), Bihar (1974), Uttar Pradesh (1977), Madhya Pradesh (1981), Andhra
Pradesh (1983), Himachal Pradesh (1983), Karnataka (1984), Assam (1986), Gujarat
(1988), Delhi (1995), Punjab (1996), Kerala (1998), Chhattisgarh (2002), Uttaranchal
(2002), West Bengal (2003), Haryana (2004) and Uttarakhand (2011).
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in a very small proportion of cases, with the decision of an ombudsman, a tribunal
or a court, and all that this would entail."' There is, likewise, little awareness of
administrative justice as a system and of the need to ensure that the relationships
between its constituent parts promote justice and reflect the needs of citizens.
X. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to chart first the rise of administrative justice
'as it emerged from the shadows' in the United Kingdom, and then its fall as
tribunals, which constitute a distinctive way of dealing with citizen vs. state
disputes, were merged with courts, and the Administrative Justice and Tribunals
Council, which was set up in 2007 to 'keep under review the performance of the
administrative justice system as a whole and advise the government on changes
in legislation, practice and procedure that would improve the ways in which it
works' faces abolition. These developments raise questions as to how all this could
have happened. A provisional answer is that, in a political system in which the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty is only weakly constrained by constitutional
considerations, where governments that can command majorities in Parliament
can almost always get their way, political 'gains' are very precarious and can be very
short-lived. The care and consideration that preceded the passage of the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the establishment of the Tribunals Service
and the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council as the 'hub of the wheel
of administrative justice'

1

are in marked contrast with the political intransigence

and absence of rational argument that were associated with their demise. Thus,
as far as administrative justice in the UK is concerned, it looks very much as if
the rise of the pendulum set in motion by the Leggatt Report and given further
impetus by the 2004 White Paper and the 2007 Act will be followed, only a few
years later, by its fall. The shaft of light which fell on administrative justice is
likely to be followed by its renewed eclipse by civil justice.
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One book whose title 'Administrative Justice in India' suggested that it might deal with
the problem, RXLDHA\KANT NAYAK+, ADUINIStaIRIvL JusicI(IL IN INDIA (1989) proved to
be a disappointment. It comprises a detailed survey of the statutory basis for, judicial
decisions of and other literature on administrative tribunals in the State of Orissa.
Leggatt, supra note 25, at para 21.
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